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Abstract
The article analyses the role played by process ambiguities in Sino-Danish 
busi ness negotiations. Process ambiguities refer to perceived expectational 
inconsistency concerning (i) appropriate forms of behaviour; (ii) attributional 
judgements; and (iii) structuring of the negotiation process. These ambiguities 
stem from dif fer enc es in negotiation scripts across Chinese and Danish cultures. 
The essential ar gu ment being advanced here is that it is the effective and/or 
the ineffective management of process ambiguities that shapes the evolution 
of the negotiating dynamic be tween Danish and Chinese business people. An 
inductive model of Sino-Dan ish business negotiations is developed that is 
based on 24 interviews conducted with Danish expatriate managers in China 
and 4 interviews with Chinese working in Danish companies. Implications for 
research and practice are discussed.  
Introduction
There is a considerable amount of literature attesting to the emergence 
of process ambiguities in Sino-Western business negotiations (e.g. Fang 
1999; Faure 1998; Kirkbride et al. 1991; Pye 1982; Tse and Walls 1994; Wel-
don and Jehn 1996; Worm and Frankenstein 2000). Process am bi gu i ties 
refer to (i) perceived expectational inconsistency concerning appropriate 
forms of behaviour; (ii) attributional judgements; and (iii) structuring of 
the negotiation process (Kumar 1999). Process am bi gu i ties are refl ective 
of the fact that negotiators have both congruent as well as incongruent 
goals (Ghauri 1996).
Faure (1998), for example, points out that the Chinese approach to 
negotiations combines 'joint quest' with 'mobile warfare'. In 'joint quest' 
the Chinese are seeking to jointly craft a solution with their coun ter part, 
while in 'mobile warfare' they are seeking to outfl ank their op po nent. 
More importantly, these two approaches are not separate and distinct 
but are part of a unifi ed negotiation strategy vis à vis their coun ter part. 
A similar argument has been advanced by Fang (1999).
The Danish approach to negotiation is, by contrast, very linear and 
con sist ent. The Danes seek to craft a solution reconciling the in ter ests 
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of the parties through persuasive argumentation (Worm 1997). While 
joint quest may be as central to the Danes as it is to the Chinese, mobile 
warfare is not part of their repertoire. In approaching negotiations from 
confl icting standpoints, each party is intentionally or unintentionally 
creating expectational inconsistency concerning appropriate forms of 
behaviour. Danes, for example, might fi nd it diffi cult to cope with co-
 op er a tive and confl ictful approaches simultaneously, while the Chi nese 
may fi nd it diffi cult to maintain linearity. Similarly, the structuring of 
the negotiation process may also be problematical.
Although script incongruence generates process am bi gu i ties, it does 
not follow that the emergence of process ambiguities will nec es sar i ly 
be detrimental to negotiations. A central argument of this article is that 
while process ambiguities are an intrinsic part of Sino-Western busi-
ness negotiations, it is the effective management of these am bi gu i ties 
that determine whether the negotiations will prove suc cess ful or not. 
This article develops an inductive model of negotiations between the 
Danes and the Chinese which outlines the origins and con se quenc es of 
process ambiguities in shaping Sino-Danish business ne go ti a tions. The 
model is developed on the basis of interviews con duct ed with Dan ish 
expatriate managers resident in China.
A number of scholars have sought to develop models of the in ter na -
tion al negotiation process (e.g. Brett 2001;  Dupont 1996; Graham and 
Sano 1985; Weiss 1993). Some of the models are micro–oriented, i.e. they 
focus on interpersonal transactions among negotiators (e.g. Brett 2001; 
Graham and Sano 1985), whereas others seek to incorporate both the 
micro- as well as macro-level variables in shaping negotiating out comes 
(e.g. Weiss 1993). Additionally, some of the models focus on a par tic u lar 
culture (e.g. Fang 1999), whereas others have a more generic ori en ta tion. 
We make an attempt here to develop a micro-oriented model of the 
Sino-Danish negotiation process . (see Figure 1) This model augments 
the existing literature in a number of ways. First, we incorporate both 
the macro- and the micro-level variables in our analysis of the interac-
tions be tween the Danish and the Chinese managers. This integration 
has rarely been conducted within the context of a specifi c culture and 
this articles goes some way towards remedying this defi ciency. Second, 
the extant lit er a ture on Sino-Danish negotiations is limited (for an ex-
ception, see Worm 1997), and this article helps bridge this lacuna in the 
literature. Finally, our paper, highlights in some detail the psychologi-
cal mechanisms in play that condition the evolution of the interaction 
among the parties. 
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Researchers recognize that negotiation is more often than not a mixed-
motive game in which actors have congruent as well as confl icting goals 
(e.g. Pruitt and Rubin 1986; Walton and McKersie 1965). Negotiators 
are constantly testing each other's intentions and deciding on the ap-
 pro pri ate negotiation strategy to pursue in a given negotiation context. 
These judgements take place in situations characterized by complexity, 
ambiguity, and unpredictability. The premise underlying this article is 
that negotiators from different cultures are likely to enact different scripts 
in dealing with the situation confronting them. The emergence of script 
incongruence (i.e. when the negotiation scripts confl ict) often leads to 
an interactional confl ict, and it is this theme that we wish to highlight 
and develop here in the context of Sino-Danish negotiations. 
Method
Sample
The sample consisted of 24 Danish expatriates and 4 Chinese working 
as general managers for Danish companies in China. We requested the 
Dan ish general managers to participate in a study of Chinese ne go ti at ing 
prac tic es. With one exception, all of the individuals who were ap proached 
agreed to participate and the response rate was above 90 per cent.
The Danish respondents' average age was 39 and they had lived in 
Chi na on average for 4 years. All but two of the respondents were male. 
The interviews were conducted by one of the authors who is fl uent in 
both Danish and Mandarin and lasted between one and two hours. 
The pri ma ry focus of the interviews was on the negotiating experi-
ence of the Danish managers when they were seeking to manage these 
sub sid i ar ies.
Analysis
A semi-structured interview format was used to collect the data. The inter-
view format asked the respondents to assess (i) the level of mu tu al under-
standing that existed between them and the Chinese prior to negotiations; 
(ii) the evolution of the relationship between them and the Chinese as the 
negotiations developed over time; and (iii) the strength and the extent of 
the relationships that existed between them and the Chinese.
The interviews were transcribed (500 pages) and thematically ana-
lysed. We followed the process of pattern coding (Miles and Huber-
man 1994) but were careful in identifying the emergence of a particular 
pattern. When a particular pattern seemed to be emerging, we sought 
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to assess if any more evidence emerged that supported that particular 
pattern (Guba 1981). The questions that were posed to par tic i pants were 
broad, open-ended questions that were developed on the basis of the 
existing literature and pilot interviews.
The analysis of the data and the existing literature suggests that 
Sino-Danish business negotiations are situated in contextual ambigui-
ties. Contextual ambiguities are an ever-present feature of transitional 
econ o mies like China (Peng 2000). The concept refers to the fl uidity of 
the business context within which negotiation occurs which manifests 
it self in the fact that many laws/regulations that the Chinese negotiator 
is supposed to observe are often not codifi ed (Boisot and Child 1986). 
While the sources of contextual ambiguities are manifold (political shifts; 
bureaucratic behaviour; complexity of the transition process; shifts in 
external economic environment), their impact on the negotiation proc ess 
can often be profound. Ongoing negotiations may come to an abrupt halt 
or the parameters for the negotiations may suddenly undergo a radical 
shift, making it necessary to restart negotiations. It is also con ceiv a ble 
that even recently concluded negotiations may be called into question. 
Most if not all of the respondents noted that contextual am bi gu i ty was 
an inherent feature of all Sino-Danish business negotiations. Interestingly 
enough, and contrary to the received wisdom, contextual ambiguity was 
not perceived by the Danes to be particularly prob lem at i cal. Indeed, 
a number of Danish respondents noted that contextual ambiguities 
generated greater stress among the Chinese than amongst the Danes 
themselves. This leads to the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: Contextual ambiguity is an intrinsic feature of 
Sino-Danish business negotiations. The Chinese feel more threatened 
by contextual ambiguity than do the Danes.
What are the consequences of the emergence of contextual am bi gu i ty? 
Our data suggest that contextual ambiguity leads to the emergence of 
goal ambiguities. Goal ambiguity has a number of different im pli ca tions 
for the negotiating process. First, the presence of goal ambiguity implies 
that the Chinese negotiators are unable to articulate cogently what they 
expect to achieve from negotiations. This is the case in spite of extensive 
discussions amongst themselves as a team (Diverge 1986). Indeed, as 
one of our respondents (a Dane) noted, 'The Chinese often do not know 
whether they want a Mercedes or a Skoda'.  Relatedly, a number of other 
Danish managers also made the observation that it was unclear to them 
precisely what the Chinese goals were.
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One consequence of goal ambiguity is that as one Danish manager 
observed, 'Chinese negotiators are sometimes unable to satisfactorily 
assess the value of what their European counterparts are offering to 
them'. A further consequence of goal ambiguity is that it shapes the pat-
tern of information fl ow among Danish and Chinese negotiators. Many 
Danish managers made the rather surprising observation that while 
the Chinese are willing to disclose information, their ability to do so is 
hindered by the fact that they are either unaware of the existence of the 
relevant information and/or are unable to gain access to it be cause the 
information is not codifi ed. As one respondent pointed out, 'In general, 
the Chinese are willing to disclose information if they have it'. Another 
noted, 'If you show interest in the physical side of the project, meaning 
that you know how to operate the equipment, then the Chi nese become 
more interested in disclosing information'. Our fi nding that the Chinese 
in general are willing to disclose information but are often unable to 
do so due to the presence of goal ambiguities, con tra dicts earlier fi nd-
ings that the Chinese are not always willing to disclose information to 
Westerners (Lin 1989; Shi and Westwood 2000). 
A fi nal consequence of goal ambiguity is that it becomes very dif fi  cult 
to attain a sense of fi nality or closure to the negotiation process. This 
manifests itself in the widely noted observation that negotiations with 
the Chinese take an excessive amount of time. Traditionally, or gan i z-
a tion al scholars have attributed the lengthiness of the negotiation proc-
ess to the need to establish trust with the Chinese. Although this may 
indeed be a part of the explanation, our data suggest that ne go ti a tion 
delays are also directly attributable to the existence of goal am bi gu i ties. 
This leads us to the following proposition:
PROPOSITON 2: Contextual ambiguity leads to the emergence of 
goal ambiguities.
How does the emergence of goal ambiguities shape the ne go ti a tion 
proc ess? Our fi ndings suggest that goal ambiguities generate or mag-
 ni fy pre-existing process ambiguities. Process ambiguities centre around 
three major issues: (i) perceived expectational inconsistency con cern ing 
appropriate forms of behaviour; (ii) attributional judge ments; and (iii) 
structuring of the negotiation process. A considerable amount of lit er a-
 ture on Chinese negotiating behaviour emphasizes the unique as pects 
of Chinese behaviour (Bond 1991; Chang and Holt 1994; Hwang 1987). 
Many theorists have paid particular attention to the role played by face in 
Chinese society and maintain that face is closely associated with power 
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and status in China (e.g. Weldon and Jehn 1996). Although this could 
also be said of other societies around the world, it does have a unique 
resonance in Confucian-based societies. 
Although giving face to the Chinese and/or preventing them from 
losing face may be problematical for the Danes, some of our re spond ents 
noted that an over-emphasis on face is not desirable either, for it may 
maximize rather than minimize interactional ambiguity. The rea son is 
at least partly that the Danes have a limited understanding of face. A 
respondent noted that, 'if you try to be accommodating by in di cat ing 
that you are willing to do something for the Chinese, for the reason of 
face-giving they will come back later and require that you keep your 
"promises"'. Another Danish respondent was surprised that a Chinese 
colleague felt he had lost face when he was moved from a position as 
sales manager to product manager. Thus, while Danes rec og nize the 
importance of face, it is unclear to them as to how much effort they need 
to invest in this direction. 
Danish respondents also noted the diffi culty of making iso mor phic 
attributions about their counterparts' behaviour. Although mak ing the 
right attributional judgements is a problem both in intracultural as well 
as intercultural interaction, diffi culties become magnifi ed in the pres-
ence of goal ambiguities. The respondents faced diffi culties in mak ing 
the right attributional judgements in the context of: (i) a dis crep an cy 
between the strategic intentions and communicative behaviour of the 
Chinese; (ii) the timing and the management of reciprocal ob li ga tions; 
and (iii) reconciling trustworthy as well as untrustworthy be hav iours. 
As one Danish manager noted, 'The two sides do not understand each 
other. But the Chinese probably understand foreigners better than the 
Danes understand the Chinese'. Another respondent observed, 'Ne go -
ti a tion takes long time because there is no common understanding'. 
The Chinese understanding of obligations is exemplifi ed in a quote by 
a Danish manager, 'The Chinese believe that if they grant a favour to a 
European, they will get the favour returned to them'. The importance 
of trust was noted by a Danish manager who observed, 'Trust is of 
course important in a network-based society with no legal tradition'. 
But an oth er manager thought otherwise, 'Maybe trust is not important 
any more, but there is still some "Chinese-ness" which is important'. 
In ap pro pri ate judgements may prevent the fi nalization of a mutually 
ben e fi  cial deal because a high degree of insecurity or vulnerability may 
prompt one or all of the parties to disengage from the negotiations.
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Finally, the Danish respondents also noted the diffi culty of struc tur ing 
the negotiation process with the Chinese. Commonplace dif fi  cul ties cen-
tred around socializing with the Chinese; confl icting and hid den agen das 
within the Chinese negotiating team; and confl icting busi ness models 
that became evident at the negotiating table. Commenting on the issue 
of socializing, one Chinese manager explained, 'If you de cline a glass 
of wine at the dinner table, the Chinese perceive it as not giving face, 
which may lead to a breakdown in negotiations, because the Chinese 
think you have a bad attitude towards them'. On the other side, one 
Danish manager not ed, 'There are almost always con tra dic tions in the 
Chinese negotiating team'. This leads us to the third prop o si tion:
PROPOSITION 3: Goal ambiguities lead to the emergence of process 
ambiguities. Process ambiguities revolve around (i) perceived expec-
tational inconsistency concerning appropriate behaviour; (ii) attribu-
tional judgements; and (iii) structuring of the negotiation process.
Process ambiguities are likely to impede the effi ciency and/or the effec-
tiveness of value creation for a number of different reasons. First, they 
slow down the process of negotiations. Second, process am bi gu i ties 
make the process of negotiation a cyclical one. Periods of progress are 
followed by periods of retardation and it is often unclear how the ne-
gotiation is developing. This lack of linearity in the ne go ti a tion process 
often generates considerable frustration among Danish negotiators. If 
the Danish negotiators are unable to deal with their frus tra tion in a 
culturally adept way, this may cause a loss of face for them selves as 
well as for the Chinese. Finally, process ambiguities also hinder the 
development of interpersonal relationships among the negotiators if 
they lead to inappropriate attributional judgements. This leads to the 
fourth proposition:
PROPOSITION 4: Process ambiguities impede the effi ciency and/or 
the effectiveness of value creation in Sino-Danish business interactions.
Although process ambiguities undoubtedly condition the process of 
value creation in Sino-Danish business interactions, it is by no means 
the case that all Sino-Danish business interactions are subject to the vi-
 cis si tudes of process ambiguities. The critical question therefore arises: 
What allows some interactions to emerge relatively unscathed from the 
emergence of process ambiguities whereas other interactions are un a ble 
to effectively cope with process ambiguities? A key theme emerg ing 
from our fi ndings was that the management of process ambiguities was 
crucially dependent on (i) similarity in the frames of reference of the 
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negotiators; (ii) the motivation and the ability of the Danish man ag ers to 
maintain and sustain relationships in the Chinese socio-cultural context; 
and (iii) a good understanding of the Chinese decision-making network 
and structure.
Commonality in Frames of Reference
Similarity in frames of reference may help the participants to ef fec -
tive ly deal with perceived expectational inconsistencies concerning 
ap pro pri ate behaviours. If the participants, for example, have fairly 
similar con cep tions of what it means to negotiate, or understand the 
nature of is sues involved in negotiations in similar ways, they may be 
better able to cope with the expectational inconsistencies concerning 
appropriate behaviour. The interview data suggest that the ability to 
cope with expectational inconsistencies was heavily predicated on (i) 
differences in the age of Chinese and Danish negotiators; (ii) the kind 
of in ter pret ers that were used; (iii) the nature of the business issue; and 
(iv) the Dan ish belief in the ability of the Chinese to manage complex 
technical proc ess es. 
A number of Danish respondents mentioned that the negotiating 
proc ess ran much more smoothly when they negotiated with younger 
as opposed to older Chinese. They found the younger Chinese to be 
much more Westernized in that they were more open to and capable of 
be hav ing according to Western behavioural norms. One instance of this 
is the willingness of the younger Chinese to accept responsibility for 
their actions. Their communication style was also much more explicit 
than implicit, making the transfer of information a very smooth process. 
One Danish manager noted, 'In particular older people are diffi cult to 
per suade. Younger people are easier'. Another manager made a similar 
comment when he observed that 'It is easier to build trust based re la tions 
to younger people. They are less political'. 
The need for interpreters in the negotiation process is all but in ev i ta ble 
given the existence of the language barrier between the Danes and the 
Chinese. Although the use of interpreters is supposed to help both the 
Chinese and the Danes to cope with expectational in con sist en cy con-
cerning appropriate behaviour, the potential benefi t of the in ter pret er 
depended very much on whose interpreter was used and the means 
by which the interpreter fulfi lled his/her role. Danish re spond ents 
preferred to rely on their own interpreters but this in itself became a 
barrier in dealing with expectational inconsistencies concerning ap pro -
pri ate behaviour. The problem was that the Chinese, while wary of the 
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use of interpreters, become even more wary when dealing with in ter -
pret ers hired by the Danes. The Chinese would often insist on the use 
of their own interpreter or alternatively that each side used their own 
interpreter. In circumstances where that was not possible, they would 
become guarded in the exchange of information. A number of Danish 
respondents sought to lessen the negative consequences by re ly ing on 
interpreters who had good connections with their Chinese coun ter parts. 
The second problem in the use of ethnic Chinese interpreters hired by 
the Danes was that many of these interpreters were more con cerned 
about preventing the negotiators from losing face than in trans lat ing 
the exact meaning of what was said. As one Danish manager explained, 
'Some interpreters do not dare translate certain questions because they 
are too direct for their boss. He might become angry'. An unfortunate 
consequence of this was that this heightened the perceived expectational 
inconsistency in behaviour from the Danish standpoint.
The management of perceived expectational inconsistencies in behav-
iour was also very much infl uenced by the nature of the business issues 
under discussion. In cases where there was a fundamental con fl ict in 
the business strategy of the Chinese and the Danish business partner, 
the confl ict only served to accentuate perceived expectational incon-
sistencies in behaviour. A good example of this is a typical Sino-Dan-
ish joint venture where the Danish partner is willing to wait for yields 
from investment while the Chinese expect an immediate dis tri bu tion 
of dividends. 
Our interviews also indicated that, as one Danish manager ob served, 
'Danes do not believe that the Chinese can handle complicated technical 
processes'. The consequence was that it amplifi ed the per ceived expecta-
tional inconsistency in behaviours among the par tic i pants. Thus, when 
the Chinese failed to manage complex technical processes ad e quate ly, it 
was automatically inferred that this represented a lack of understanding 
on their part rather than cultural constraints.
In sum, our interview data suggest that the perceived expectational 
inconsistencies in behaviours were either mitigated or amplifi ed by 
sim i lar i ties or differences in the cognitive frames of ne go ti a tors.
Motivation/Ability to Maintain Relationships and the 
Accuracy/ Favourableness of Attributional Judgements
Attributions are an important precursor of an actor's behaviour. At-
tributional judgements determine how we react to our counterpart's 
behaviour. If, for example, we perceive our counterpart to be trust-
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 wor thy, we will respond in a manner that will validate our counterpart's 
perception. There is a considerable amount of evidence demonstrating 
the linkage between attributions and behaviour. Incorrect attributions 
often lead to the emergence of vicious circles in negotiations (see George 
and Gonzales 1998; Kumar 1999). 
Our fi ndings suggest that the motivation and the ability of the Dan-
ish managers to develop relationships with their Chinese coun ter parts 
depend on their temporal orientation, the ease with which a trust ing 
relationship can be established with their counterparts, their ability to 
be fl exible and fulfi l their obligations, and fi nally their willingness to 
engage in saving face and giving face. 
A frequently mentioned criticism of the Chinese negotiating style is 
that it is too time-consuming (e.g. Brunner and Wang 1988). From the 
Chinese perspective, spending time at the onset is essential to contextual-
ize negotiations and to gain some information about their counterparts. 
The Danish respondents noted that if the Chinese feel that they are 
under a time constraint, they will seek to withdraw from the negotia-
tions. This is not surprising given the high uncertainty aver sion that is 
characteristic of the Chinese culture (Hofstede 1993). High uncertainty 
avoidance leads the Chinese to avoid the presence of neg a tive outcomes 
rather than maximizing positive outcomes. In any event, time pressures 
induce the Chinese to make an unfavourable at tri bu tion, but by the same 
token the Chinese reaction may itself induce an unfavourable attribution 
on the part of the Danes. 
An attribution conducive to strengthening the interaction among 
the actors requires the skillful use of time and timing. Danish manag-
ers noted that a more fl exible attitude towards time enables them to 
more accurately assess the intentions of their counterpart. As a Danish 
man ag er observed 'Timing is as important as time'. Another noted 'The 
Chi nese are good negotiators. Most often the Danes give in due to time 
pressure'. At the same time skillful use of time allows either side to 
carefully calibrate the exchange of information in a matter conducive 
to accurate and favorable judgements of either party. 
A number of Danish managers made the interesting remark that Chi-
nese would often willingly disclose information provided they were 
given the time to do so. One Danish manager made the observation 
that 'The Chinese are slow to give information because they don't know 
what kind of information to summarize and/or how to present it. A 
lot of Chinese don't prepare documentation well in advance before the 
negotiation'. Once the cycle of positive reciprocity begins to emerge, the 
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Chinese are also likely to confer favours on the Danish negotiators. In 
oth er words, the effective use of time allows for the possibility of deepen-
ing the relationship among the parties – a relationship which will then 
permit the participants to accurately gauge and evaluate each other. 
China, unlike Denmark, has often been described as a low-trust soci-
ety (Fukuyama 1995). Conversely, the conventional wisdom among the 
Chinese is that foreigners come to China to take advantage of them. The 
critical implication of the above is that interactions between the Chinese 
and the Danes proceed from a low level of trust. There are many different 
kinds of trust, such as relational, calculative, deterrence trust (Rousseau 
et al. 1998), with calculative trust being of particular importance in the 
negotiation process, while relational trust is some thing that builds over 
a number of years. The initiation of interactions from a low trust base is 
likely to create inaccurate as well as un fa vour a ble attributions on both 
sides. Danes perceive the Chinese as having a hidden agenda while the 
Chinese perceive the Danes as taking ad van tage of them. An interesting 
insight on this comes from a Danish man ag er who noted, 'The Chinese 
are not honest, so it's diffi cult to believe them when negotiating employ-
ment. I don't trust the Chinese'.
However, the Danish managers also pointed out that confl icting 
perceptions can sometimes be reconciled through face-to-face in ter -
ac tion, respecting Chinese behavioural norms and participation in joint 
activities like going to the theatre or playing football. One interesting 
observation is that it is easier to build trust with younger Chinese than 
with the older Chinese – although the trust with the younger Chinese 
may not be as durable as with the older generation. Our data suggest 
that while trust is an essential precondition for negotiations in China, 
the Chinese are moving away from an affect-based to a cognition-based 
trust (McCallister 1995). The latter is based more on exchange of fa vours 
than on human bonding.
The Chinese are not considered as being fl exible by the vast ma jor i ty 
of Danish respondents. Nevertheless, the Danish attribute this lack of 
fl exibility to the organizational constraints within which the Chinese 
negotiators have to function. Indeed, at a personal level, the Chinese are 
considered to be fl exible, a view reinforced by  one Danish manager:  'The 
Chinese are fl exible, but the system is not so they can not appear fl exible'. 
Another noted, 'They are not fl exible but are pro fes sion al. The Shanghai 
people are more smart, and sometimes do not com mit themselves'. In-
terestingly, this lack of fl exibility is not viewed as a barrier to furthering 
interaction between the Chinese and the Danes. Most importantly, the 
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Chinese are viewed by the Danes as being prag mat ic and this attribution 
is certainly conducive to facilitating in ter ac tion among them.
The discharge of obligations is a central part of the Chinese cul ture. 
Indeed, the ability to fulfi l obligations in an appropriate manner is con-
sidered essential to one's ability to relate effectively with other peo ple 
(Hwang 1987; Gao 1996). A major point of difference between the Danes 
and the Chinese can be seen in the manner in which they handle favours. 
While the Danes wish to repay favours immediately, the Chi nese are not 
eager to discharge the debt straightaway. As one Danish manager noted, 
'The Chinese are not eager to repay favours im me di ate ly. They prefer to 
discharge the debt at a time when it will be ben e fi  cial for the different 
parties'. Another observed 'Chinese believe that if they grant a favour 
to a European, they will get the favour returned to them'. Differences in 
the way that the actors manage obligations have the potential of creating 
a schism among the actors. The Danish desire to repay a debt immedi-
ately will not enhance the relationship between the parties, while the 
expectation on the part of the Chinese for return a favour at some point 
in the future may generate distrust and tension among the Danes. 
Face is a central construct in Chinese society. It is literally the front part 
of the head and the fi rst thing that is noticed when meeting an oth er per-
son. Face refl ects the complexity of interpersonal re la tion ships in China 
(Chang and Holt 1994). It refers to a person's status or the prestige that 
one attains through one's accomplishments. Although face is important 
in all societies, it plays a particularly critical role in China (Bond 1991). 
Although causing the Chinese to lose face is likely to dam age the rela-
tionship, some Danish respondents noted that there had been too much 
emphasis on face; indeed, they maintained  that the over-sensitivity of 
the Danes to Chinese concerns led the latter to use face as a tactical tool 
against them. While a sensitivity to Chinese face-related concerns is 
es sen tial in developing a good relationship, an over-sen si tiv i ty in this 
regard may maximize rather than minimize interactional ambiguity. 
Information exchange is also crucial in shaping the pattern of re la -
tion ship among the actors. Although actors everywhere are cautious in 
exchanging information, fearing that they might be exploited oth er wise 
(Pruitt and Carnevale 1993), a failure to exchange information will pre-
vent the actors from furthering or deepening their relationship. There is 
a duality here which needs to be effectively managed. Research to date 
has viewed the Chinese as being less willing to disclose in for ma tion 
than Westerners.
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Our fi ndings, by contrast, have uncovered a strikingly different pat-
tern. The majority of the respondents noted that the Chinese are willing 
to disclose information provided they have it. As one Danish man ag er 
noted, 'While the Chinese are willing to disclose information, their 
ability to do so is hindered by the fact that they are usually unaware of 
the existence of the relevant information'. Thus it was their incapacity 
rather than motivation which prevented the Chinese from sharing in-
 for ma tion. The Danes thus preferred to make a situational as opposed 
to an internal attribution, and this kind of attribution is undoubtedly 
facilitative of interaction. 
Our fi ndings suggest the importance of the relational dimension in 
shaping the attribution made by actors. A positive relationship gen er ates 
favourable/accurate attributions that may help the actors to cope ef-
fectively with unexpected interruptions in the negotiation process. It 
also became apparent that the relationship among actors is infl uenced 
by a number of factors, some of which work for, and some which work 
against, the relationship. 
Structural Dimension and the Structuring of the 
Negotiation Process
The structuring of the negotiation process refers to the effi ciency and the 
ease by which the negotiators are able to arrive at an agreement and/or 
recognize that the potential transaction may not have much value from 
their standpoint. In other words, an appropriate structuring of the ne-
gotiating process may be mutually benefi cial in that it provides fi  nal i ty 
whether in a positive or in a negative sense.
Our data suggest that the structuring of the negotiating process is 
crucially dependent on the overall pattern of connectivity among the 
actors (Burt 1992). The pattern of connectivity has a number of distinct 
dimensions namely, (i) network ties; (ii) network confi gurations; (iii) 
intermediaries; (iv) communications confi guration and socializing. 
We also found that network ties have a direct impact on the ef fi  cien cy 
and the ease with which negotiators are able to arrive at an agreement 
or recognize that the potential transaction may not have much merit. 
Several respondents noted that you cannot do business in China with out 
the presence of a guanxi (network). As one Danish manager ob served, 
'Guanxi is important when you try to convince Chinese ne go ti a tors. They 
tend to accept your arguments if they trust you'.  Another respondent 
noted, 'I can call the boss of all relevant organizations and set up a meet-
ing due to the good guanxi we have'. Although networks are important 
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even in Western societies, Tung and Worm (2001) note that networks in 
China are more enduring; elicit more favours; and are more personal. 
Most fundamentally, networks provide an immediate and a direct access 
to decision-makers. They therefore can either ease the process of initiat-
ing negotiations in China or they can help the ne go ti a tors to effectively 
deal with the problems that may emerge in the negotiation process.
Network confi gurations in China have both a formal as well as an 
informal dimension. Danish respondents noted that while the for mal 
confi guration was transparent, the informal confi guration was not. A 
Danish respondent noted, 'The hierarchy of the Chinese negotiation 
team becomes clear during the negotiations, but there are always many 
departments represented in the team. Sometimes the representatives 
from the different departments cooperate, but often they compete. We 
don't know what is going on behind the scenes'. The Danes found the 
informal confi guration harder to penetrate and yet noted that the in-
 for mal confi guration was often decisive in shaping the emerging pattern 
of negotiations. 
Intermediaries have traditionally been important in China in both 
initiating, as well as managing, confl icts that emerge among ne go ti a tors. 
Consistent with this fi nding, our Danish respondents recognized the 
importance of intermediaries in facilitating interactions with the Chi-
nese but noted that it is often diffi cult to assess the reliability of these 
intermediaries. A related point of worry is that if the fi rms choose not 
to utilize the intermediaries, they may well go and work for their com-
petitors –  a thought not very appealing to the Danes.
Communication patterns and socializing are also pivotal in struc-
 tur ing the negotiation process. Danish respondents noted the impor-
tance of circling around an issue in China before getting to the heart 
of the negotiation. It is through circling that a surface harmony is built 
up. Furthermore respondents also noted the importance of listening in 
Chi na. Effective listening may facilitate the negotiation process in di rect 
as well as indirect ways. 
Conclusion 
A considerable amount of literature demonstrates the unique aspects 
of Chinese negotiating behaviour and the interactional diffi culties that 
often emerge in Sino-Western negotiations. The contribution of this ar-
 ti cle is twofold. First of all, we have suggested that while interactional 
diffi culties are often present, these diffi culties are not insurmountable. 
Second, we have posited that the existing dichotomy between co op -
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er a tive and non-cooperative Chinese behaviour, or different behaviour 
to wards 'insiders' and 'outsiders' to which many scholars allude, may 
provide only a partial explanation of the dynamics of Sino-Western in-
 ter ac tion. While it is true that the cooperative and the non-cooperative 
dimension in Chinese behaviour is often integrated by the Chinese in a 
holistic manner (Fang 1999), it is important to recognize that this may 
be less a refl ection of their strategic intentions than of their strategic 
inability to effectively manage the negotiation process, particularly in 
cross-cultural interactions. It is also worth pointing out that what may 
be perceived as holistic integration by the Chinese may be viewed very 
differently from the Danish perspective. 
The model that we have outlined here is an inductive model, de rived 
on the basis of Danish perceptions. Danish perceptions of the ne go ti a tion 
process may be very different from that of the Chinese and a complete 
model may be needed to fully encapsulate both sides of the picture. 
Second, the Danish interviewees had been living in China for an average 
of 4 years. Their perception and understanding of the Chi nese may not 
be fully representative of Westerners who are negotiating in China for 
the very fi rst time. Finally, the model that we outline here needs to be 
sharply refi ned and subject to empirical testing. Our aim in writing this 
article is not simply to document the differences that exist between the 
Danes and the Chinese, but more importantly to outline the nature of 
process ambiguities that arise in Sino-Danish interactions and to show 
how the management of process ambiguities affects the dynamics of 
the negotiating process.
Rajesh Kumar is Associate Professor of International Business, Aarhus School 
of Business and Verner Worm is Associate Professor of International Business,                          
Copenhagen Business School.
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